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ABSTRACT
The article addresses the implications of Prevent and Channel for epistemic 
justice. The first section outlines the background of Prevent. It draws upon 
Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd’s concept of the collective imaginary, 
alongside Lorraine Code’s concept of epistemologies of mastery, in order 
to outline some of the images and imaginaries that inform and orient 
contemporary counter-terrorist preventative initiatives, in particular those 
affecting education. Of interest here is the way in which vulnerability (to 
radicalisation) is conceptualised in Prevent and Channel, in particular the 
way in which those deemed ‘at risk of radicalisation’ are constituted as 
vulnerable and requiring intervention. The imaginary underpinning such 
preventative initiatives is, I argue, a therapeutic/epidemiological one. If 
attention is paid to the language associated with these interventions, 
one finds reference to terms such as contagion, immunity, resilience, 
grooming, virus, susceptibility, therapy, autonomy, vulnerability and 
risk—a constellation of images/concepts resonant with therapeutic and 
epidemiological theories and practices. I outline some of the implications of 
this therapeutic/epidemiological imaginary for epistemic injustice. If people, 
in this case, students, teachers and parents, feel that their voice will not be 
given credence, this leads to testimonial injustice. If one group is constituted 
as a suspect community, this risks hermeneutical injustice for that group—a 
situation facing Muslims at present. Given the requirements for educators 
and educational institutions to enact this particular iteration of preventative 
counter-terrorist legislation, the way in which vulnerability (to radicalisation) 
is understood and operationalised has direct bearing upon education and 
the educational experience of all stakeholders, in particular in relation to the 
conditions for epistemic justice.
Introduction
In this essay, I assess the potential impact for students and teachers of the counter-terrorism legisla-
tion called Prevent and the de-radicalisation programme Channel through a careful analysis of the 
implications of the appeal to the concept of vulnerability (to radicalisation). Whilst much has been 
written about the relationship between the War on Terror and education (Giroux, 2003), this essay 
is concerned with the risk of epistemic injustice as a consequence of discourses, policies, laws, and 
practices in counter-radicalisation and prevention of terrorism. My argument is that the ‘imaginary’ 
(a concept I will explain) that accompanies, and is constitutive of, the concept of (potential) vulnerability 
(to radicalisation), a concept that underpins counter-terrorist preventative strategies in education, risks 
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epistemic injustice, both hermeneutic and testimonial, by in effect silencing and denying credibility to 
(Muslim) students, parents, and educators, especially those who contest Prevent, and by constructing 
a set of (implicitly) racialised, colonial frameworks that constitute Muslims as a suspect community 
(Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010; Bonino, 2013; Githens-Mazer, 2010, 2012; Hillyard, 1993; Hickman, Thomas, 
nickels, & Silvestri, 2012; Jackson, 2008; Kundnani, 2009, 2015; Mythen, Walklate, & Khan, 2009; Pantazis 
& Pemberton, 2009, 2011; Spalek, 2011).
Prevent also has implications for any student who adopts a dissenting or radical position that involves 
questioning, for example, fundamental British values (FBV) or British foreign policy. non-violent extrem-
ist positions can, in principle, equally make one a target for de-radicalising or counter-radicalising inter-
ventions. However, authors like Kundnani (2014) argue that Muslims in particular are being racialised in 
counter-terrorist policies such as COnTeST (Counter-Terrorism Strategy). By marking out certain bodies 
as potentially carrying certain traits or dispositions by virtue of, for example, clothing, this produces 
disenfranchisement, exclusion, prejudice, racism, and Islamophobia. The question of racism in relation 
to epistemic injustice is deserving of greater consideration than I give it in this essay, even if it informs 
implicitly and explicitly much of what follows, in particular the sections relating to colonialism and 
contagion.
Under the Prevent Strand of COnTeST, the duty to prevent terrorism is now enforced by law for 
educators in the UK, as well as for workers across a range of other sectors. I have previously examined 
some of the problematic assumptions underpinning this legislation and the implications of referrals 
to Channel which has developed a multi-agency approach to people ‘at risk of radicalisation’, as well as 
others who are or who have been ‘radicalised’ (O’Donnell, 2016). There I argued that the way in which 
radicalisation is conceptualised in the pre-crime sphere has considerable implications for students 
who must question whether, and to what extent, they can speak freely (what Michel Foucault calls 
parrhesia) without risk of referral, as well as for freedom of thought in classrooms. In that essay, I argued 
that genuine education, as opposed to indoctrination, is by its very nature anti-extremist, requiring 
and demanding careful, rigorous and reasoned discussion of difficult topics in such a way that avoids 
the pitfalls of either relativism or forms of authoritarian ‘liberalism’ that rely upon a single narrative 
and refuse the complex, messy stories such as those of colonialism, empire, racism and Islamophobia. 
I suggested that the policy of Prevent risks silencing students and teachers, making very difficult the 
openness, fearless speech, trust, humility, and critical thought that are required for genuine engage-
ment in education by all parties.
The Prevent strategy directly affects the lives of students and teachers, and the nature and experience 
of education, because by making it a statutory obligation for educators and institutions to prevent 
terrorism and to report students ‘at risk of radicalisation’, it securitises education. Indicators of vulnera-
bility to, or potential risk of, radicalisation operate in the ‘pre-crime’ domain (McCulloch and Pickering, 
2009): some students are potentially vulnerable and susceptible to perhaps becoming involved (at an 
indefinite future date) in terrorism. This is not based on evidence but rather on ‘indicators’ that are very 
generally defined (Russell Group, 2015), as I explain below. In this respect, the concept of vulnerability 
in Prevent policy documentation and toolkits is not simply a diagnostic category, opposed to resilience, 
but relies upon what has been called ‘anticipatory’ or ‘pre-cautionary’ logics. The use of such indicators 
prevails despite strong arguments made against the very concept of radicalisation by experts in ter-
rorism studies, such as Horgan (2014) who consistently maintains that it is impossible to predict who 
will become a terrorist, even if one can describe how people may become terrorists. Indeed, Durodié 
(2016) writing about contemporary education states that the practices inaugurated with Prevent and 
Channel amount to the ‘therapeutisation of security’.
The essay addresses three primary themes. The first section outlines the background of Prevent 
and introduces the concepts of the ‘imaginary’ and ‘image’, in particular in relation to the way in which 
vulnerability (to radicalisation) is conceptualised in Prevent. The second longer part examines the oper-
ation of what I call the therapeutic/epidemiological imaginary in respect of the constellation of images/
concepts and practices of intervention associated with this imaginary. The final part outlines some of 
the implications of this imaginary for epistemic injustice. Given the requirements for educators and 
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educational institutions to enact this particular version of preventative counter-terrorist legislation, 
the way in which vulnerability (to radicalisation) is understood has direct bearing upon education.
FBV, muscular liberalism and vulnerability
In a speech in Munich in 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron said that it was essential to be clear 
about where the origins of terrorism lay. They lie in the existence of an ideology of ‘Islamist extremism’, 
an extremist political ideology supported by a minority. He claimed that state multiculturalism had 
‘encouraged cultures to live separate lives, had not offered a vision of a society to which people want 
to belong’ and had promoted a form of ‘hands-off tolerance’ leaving ‘some young Muslims feeling root-
less, looking for something to belong to’. Cameron’s speech elides a number of issues. He distinguishes 
between Islam and Islamist extremism but then suggests that Muslim communities engage in unaccept-
able views and practices. He suggests that it is the sense of a lack of belonging has led to a process of 
radicalisation amongst young people, and his sole allusion to the implications of foreign policy is to say 
that ‘preachers of hate can sow misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere’ (Cameron, 2011). 
The solution appears to be twofold: to ‘confront and undermine’ the ideology of extremism and to build 
a common and shared British identity. What is required, he says, is ‘a more active, muscular liberalism’. 
He posits that exposure to non-violent extremist ideas can be a precursor to violence. Ultimately what 
this analysis legitimates is an intensification of the security framework through the introduction of the 
new legal duty to prevent terrorism, a commitment that had previously been requested on a voluntary 
basis from the first iterations of preventative counter-terrorism.
In July 2015, it was made a statutory obligation for a range of professionals from the crèche worker 
to the doctor to the university lecturer to prevent terrorism. They were also required to teach or commu-
nicate FBV. Counter-terrorism language moved from the ‘them vs. us’ Manichaean discourse post 9/11, 
to ‘battles of ideas’, and then finally to a softer, quasi-therapeutic approach that images the potential 
home-grown terrorist as a vulnerable person who needs support. This model privileges the notion that 
the explanatory paradigm for terrorism requires identifying emotional and existential vulnerability, 
and the solution to terrorism involves addressing said vulnerabilities in the population. (This does not 
seem to allow for the possibility that some people may make a choice to take a particular route towards 
violence, and that they may be exercising agency in so doing.) The images mobilised by Prevent sug-
gest that those who risk engaging in terrorism are passive and vulnerable subjects who have become 
‘infected’ or ‘gripped’ by ideas, and who are thus in need of intervention and support, but they are also 
and simultaneously constituted as potentially dangerous. According to this logic, if the root cause of 
the radicalisation to violence is exposure to certain Islamic theological ideas, then these ideas must be 
rooted out and those populations susceptible to being influenced by such ideas must be identified. 
Instead of simply countering violent extremism, or, even more problematically, non-violent extremism, it 
is now those who are ‘at risk of radicalisation’ who must be identified, targeted and supported. In a critical 
essay that raises the issue of how those who hold ‘extremist’ ideas but who also hold to non-violence 
may be targeted under such legislation, Richards (2011) offers a careful reading of the inconsistencies 
of argumentation in Home Office documentation, pointing out that whilst some extremist ideas are 
obnoxious, the purpose of counter-terrorism legislation should be to counter terrorism and violent 
extremism, not to police ideas.
That there is little evidence that ideas or ideology cause terrorism, the fact there is no generic profile 
of the terrorist, and the likelihood is that a more complex confluence of factors bring people to use 
violence for political aims are all acknowledged in the Prevent documentation, yet despite this, it still 
suggests that professionals can be trained to identify the attitudinal and behavioural indicators of those 
at risk, and that these indicate whether someone is potentially on a pathway to terrorism. The documen-
tation emphasises that the legislation will not infringe upon free speech and academic freedom, yet 
(and often in the same sentence) it also states that the existence of non-violent extremist ideas must 
be addressed. It uses powerful metaphors that images those ‘extremist ideas’ as a ‘pool’ or ‘oxygen’ in 
which terrorists can swim and breathe. The focus on ideas and beliefs, rather than violent methods, and 
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the codified list of generic indicators of vulnerability under the categories of ‘engagement’, ‘intent’ and 
‘capability’ (many of which in the first two categories would describe many citizens) seems to ignore 
some of the essential questions for any counter-terrorist strategy, such as: why do people choose to use 
violence to achieve their ends? Or more importantly, how can those who are actively seeking to engage 
in violence or terrorism be identified? How do people get involved? Holding radical or extreme ideas 
does not mean one will support or use violence (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). A focus on ideas and potential 
pathways to radicalisation (to violence) is serving to create an environment of self-censorship and 
self-surveillance of those perceived as being ‘at risk of radicalisation’ (Brown & Saeed, 2015; Kundnani, 
2014, 2015). Mechanisms of surveillance are being embedded across those key societal institutions 
and organisations that engage with children and young people. Such pre-emptive interventions are 
often justified using language drawn from child protection and sexual abuse, in particular ‘grooming’.
The concomitant requirement that educational institutions teach FBV implies that there is universal 
agreement in respect of the meaning of values and concepts such as democracy, rule of law, mutual 
respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs, and individual liberty. Despite claims to the contrary, 
it does not allow for or invite dissent or debate over these and alternative ethical and political concepts 
since extremism itself is defined negatively (and ambiguously) as ‘vocal or active opposition to FBV’ 
(HM Government, 2013, p. 1). Merely expressing ‘non-violent extremist ideas’ is seen as contributing 
potentially to radicalisation and to terrorism. The language of FBV also implies that some citizens are not 
sufficiently British or do not wish to be British, and that they have isolated and segregated themselves, 
but it doesn’t permit the exploration of practices of discrimination, prejudice and racism that seek to 
exclude some from belonging to the body politic as full citizens, it does not investigate the legacies of 
empire, genocide and slavery in the British imaginary, or allow for the disaffection that many citizens 
have with their State. It also does not acknowledge the consistent suspension of the law through 
emergency counter-terrorist legislation.
Potential vulnerability and the ‘risk of radicalisation’
In order to understand how this concept of vulnerability (to radicalisation) has performative force 
in the everyday lives of students and educators, the concepts of ‘image’ and of the ‘imaginary’ are 
helpful. Image and imaginary are here understood to be constitutive of concepts and generative of 
lived practices of sensing, perceiving and conceiving, rather than simply illustrative of concepts. For 
example, Hobbes’ famous image of the Leviathan does not simply illustrate an idea, but is constitutive 
of a particular concept of sovereignty. Similarly, the image of depositing is essential to grasp Freire’s 
concept of banking education (and the ways in which many teachers understand the task of education). 
These images (this is what it means to teach, this is what it means to be sovereign) are co-constitutive 
of those concepts that orient different practices of acting, living and perceiving, such as educating. If, as 
is argued, collective and social imaginaries orient our political, social and affective lives, and shape our 
concepts (Code, 2006; Fricker, 2007; Gatens & Lloyd, 1999), then understanding collective imaginaries 
means thinking about images as constitutive, generative and productive rather than as descriptive. 
For instance, when examining the ways in which vulnerability is mobilised in counter-terrorism legis-
lation, policy documentation, and training, it is imperative to reflect on the histories and associations 
of terms associated with vulnerability, for example, contagion, therapy, immunisation, susceptibility, 
purity, colonialism, and autonomy.
ecclestone and Hayes (2009) argued that we are witnessing a dangerous turn in therapeutic educa-
tion with the increasing emphasis on the ‘vulnerable self’. The case of Prevent constitutes an intensifica-
tion of such therapeutisation of education, by conceptualising vulnerability (to radicalisation) in terms 
of potential future risks rather than real existing risks. Given the statutory obligation to understand and 
locate indicators of vulnerability (to radicalisation), this shift also changes the role of the educator, the 
nature of relationships in classrooms, and ultimately the ways in which children and students imagine 
themselves and others (Brown & Saeed, 2015). The strategies of Prevent and Channel (Department for 
Children, Schools & Families [DCSF], 2008; HM Government, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015; House of Commons, 
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2010) are, I argue, underpinned by a therapeutic/epidemiological imaginary that relies upon a particular 
concept of vulnerability (to radicalisation). The conceptual apparatus and infrastructure that support 
this approach is drawn from psychology, public health, child protection (in particular in respect of 
resilience), criminology, and social work.
In this regard, this recent turn in preventative counter-terrorism with COnTeST 3 innovates signif-
icantly on the concepts of anticipatory and pre-cautionary logics as Prevent seeks to ‘act before the 
threat of the terrorist has become manifest’ (Martin, 2014, p. 66). It no longer retrospectively traces 
symptoms or ‘potentials’ from the (criminal) act of the person, but uses instead pre-emptive logics to 
attribute potential vulnerabilities, susceptibilities and dispositions to people who may have no intention 
to engage in violence and who have never engaged in violence. The shift from previous counter-terrorist 
discourses that relied on images like ‘battles’ of ideas and values to a softer, more interventionist and 
supportive framework is, paradoxically, perhaps even more disempowering for those who dissent from 
dominant norms, as now they will be classified as displaying psycho-pathological symptoms or emo-
tional vulnerabilities that need treatment, rather than being treated as political dissenters and credible 
speakers. Contemporary counter-terrorism legislation extends the ‘operation on the soul’ from those 
institutions and bodies that were previously involved in carceral networks into a capillary securitocratic 
network that expands the web of institutions and professionals directly involved in performing security, 
counter-terrorist and intelligence functions. The purpose is to identify those ‘at risk of radicalisation’ and 
institute pre-emptive forms of intervention to de-radicalise, where judged appropriate.
Collective imaginaries and epistemologies of control
Instead of reiterating the criticisms of the concept of radicalisation as many others have done (Horgan, 
2014, 2008a, 2008b; Kundnani, 2006, 2012, 2014, 2015; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2013; Sedgwick, 2010), 
I want to examine more carefully the constellation of images that orients discussions of radicalisation, 
and that underpins practices and interventions of de-radicalisation. I suggest that a number of these 
– contagion, vulnerability, susceptibility, risk, infection, grooming, virus, and germ – reveal the way 
in which epidemiological and therapeutic imaginaries are increasingly implicated in structures and 
practices of governance and government. MacDonald and Hunter’s critical discourse analysis demon-
strates the prevalence and privileging of terms like ‘vulnerability’, ‘at risk’ and ‘resilience’ and ‘support’ 
in UK counter-terrorist documentation. They identify the way which the ‘vulnerable’ subject [is con-
stituted] through a novel modality of ‘therapeutic discourse’ (2013, p. 137), arguing that this invokes 
‘a register which enmeshes this ‘imaginary’ subject in the technologies of medicalisation. The effect 
of this is to diminish the claim of the medicalised subject that his/her behaviour is autonomous and 
self-determined (2013, p. 138). The focus on interventions that target the individual, and by extension 
the community, means that discussion of the complexity of other meso- and macro- factors that may 
bring someone to use violence in the service of political ends is bracketed or ignored. In proactive, 
preventative strategies to engage the individual and the community, images of sovereignty, autonomy, 
identity and purity are implicit, particularly through the oppositional use of the terms ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘resilience’. This is in terms of both a promised return to a state of psychological normalcy, autonomy, 
agency and ‘resilience’, and because of the suggestion with FBV that there is an unproblematic and 
monolithic ground of agreed values that can anchor the body politic. In this way, little attention need 
be paid to the histories of individual, political or social bodies, the differential access to institutions, 
the ways in which bodies are raced, classed and gendered, the sympathetic identification with civilians 
dying in conflicts abroad, and so forth. The image of ‘active muscular liberalism’ produces a particular 
kind of combative political imaginary against which are presented the allegedly sealed and isolated 
communities of multicultural Britain.
Our vulnerability, openness, interdependence and the contagious nature of our affects and ideas 
invite both sociability and antagonism according to Spinoza. However, with Prevent and Channel, such 
aspects of human experience tend to be pathologised and viewed as a problem or deficit, given the 
emphasis placed on fostering resilience. This approach seems to value the institution of a more sovereign 
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and individualistic conception of autonomy in line with ‘active and muscular liberalism’ (Cameron, 2011). 
The language of resilience trades on ideas of immunity both in terms of personal resilience and the 
fortification of the boundaries of the sovereign state (Borradori, 2003) rather than com-munity (esposito 
(2013). Images are not supplementary to our mental and affective lives but are constitutive of them. 
Spinoza understood the mind to be the idea of the body: anything that happens in the body is registered 
in the mind, and vice versa. The imagination is not simply a cognitive or mental affair but is material 
and registered through our body awareness: we are always aware of other bodies at the same time as 
our own. This susceptibility and openness to the emotions and ideas of others, and this experience of 
shared vulnerability and interdependence, are understood to be constitutive of the human condition. 
They are also that which allows us to develop our capacity to encounter more images, more ideas, to 
be affected in more diverse ways and thus to develop our powers of reason. To be able to be affected 
is a capability in Spinoza’s model. The problem is with dogmatic and authoritarian images and organ-
isations of power that seek to impose monolithic and generic ideas, often in order to secure relations 
of domination and passivity or to generate specific organisations of emotion around particular images.
Feminist scholarship from Le Doeuff (1989), Code (2006) and Gatens and Lloyd (1999) has long argued 
for a conception of images and the ‘imaginary’ that would pay heed to the way in which the images 
are constitutive of concepts (for example, ‘identity’). They do not believe that philosophical concepts 
can or ought to be purged of the images that orient and ground them. Indeed, what is of considerable 
interest is the way that philosophy images and imagines itself. This kind of analysis is useful in appraising 
different imaginaries; how is security imaged, or how is education imaged? Code (2006) argues that 
images have constitutive effects and shares with Gatens and Lloyd (1999) the conviction that our ways 
of knowing and our ways of inhabiting the world are co-imbricated. Code wants to understand ‘the 
metaphorics, images and symbolisms woven into dominant social-political imaginaries: to examine 
how they work to shape and govern possibilities of being, thinking, acting; how they legitimate or 
preclude certain epistemic and other human relations, to one another; how philosophical systems 
reflect and reinforce these imaginaries’ (2006, p. 11). The instantiation of the therapeutic/epidemiolog-
ical imaginary that we see with Prevent reveals a commitment to an interventionist image of mastery 
and control: knowledge here has a direct relation to power. However, epistemologies of control do 
not allow for the delicate and sensitive adjudication of competing claims and diverse imaginaries or 
the refinement of ethical sensibilities and development of contextual judgement. They venerate too 
much ‘the mastery, efficiency and control modern science is imagined to provide’ (2006, 11) instead of 
cultivating the conditions for co-habitation without consensus. They do not allow for personal stories 
and testimonies, preferring their claims to their own expertise and objectivity. This kind of approach 
imposes its framework deductively rather than thinking inductively in and from the specificity of the 
situation. Technologies and techniques of control, such as frameworks to assess vulnerabilities, add a 
veneer of scientific credibility and authority whilst foreclosing the kind of humility, questioning and 
uncertainty that ought to accompany the human encounter and that would create the conditions for 
genuine dialogue.
Like Spinoza, Gatens and Lloyd (1999) worry about those images and imaginaries that serve to dom-
inate and subject others, diminishing the power and capacity of citizens to exist, to act and to think. 
Where images and imaginaries silence the voice of someone, or their words are interpreted through 
a medicalised lens of pathology, this corrodes and fragments the social body and the possibility for 
those forms of common life that rely on giving credence to one another as speakers. The purpose of 
democratic government should be to help us to develop our powers of understanding so that we might 
make use of our lives. Like Code (2006), Gatens and Lloyd (1999) think that our ways of knowing are our 
ways of being and these are lodged in our political, social and educational institutions. If we take this 
seriously, this means that we have to reflect on the images through which we understand ourselves, 
our relation to others, and our conception of the polity.
Through that exercise in understanding, we can also come to understand the associational paths of 
our bodies in relation to different images and the ways in which the qualitative nature of our experience 
varies through such encounters: for example, what associations come to mind when I hear a certain 
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accent? even though we are determined, we can also be transformed through our understanding of 
how we are determined. This is not to suggest that one can transcend, through reason, emotional and 
social life but rather it acknowledges that our sociability and our reason stems from our dependence 
on other bodies. In this way we understand why emotions are contagious and why we identify with 
and imitate others. All of this constitutes the fabric of social life and is grounded in our interdepend-
ence and the way in which our body awareness is always mixed with the awareness of other bodies, 
present or imagined. This kind of analysis and diagnosis is attuned to vacillations of affective life, to 
antagonism and to love and friendship. It doesn’t imagine a monolithic conception of the collective 
imaginary – agreement does not mean sameness or consensus on this model – but rather seeks out 
ways in which we can better live together. Different words and images can separate and unite us, and 
we exist in networks of circulating affects and ideas, but we can find also ways of developing imaginaries 
that divide us less and that allow for more forms of conviviality and friendship. This political philosophy 
is premised upon a relational ontology that is far from the dichotomy of muscular or authoritarian 
liberalism or monolithic communalism that recent iterations of Prevent seem to suggest are the sole 
political options in British society.
Understanding the genealogies of social bodies can help us to develop sensitivity to the historical 
and contemporary resonances of concepts, like contagion or resilience, and to grasp the way in which 
images and metaphors have real effects. This might invite more consideration of the implications of 
the language and interventions adopted by Prevent and Channel, and the way in which a dominant 
social imaginary through FBV and muscular liberalism is being imposed on those presumed to be 
‘different’ or not ‘integrated’, such that it de-legitimates counter-voices and counter-images, and even 
other imaginings of what it means to be British. There may be echoes in all of this of what Gilroy (2004) 
calls ‘postcolonial melancholia’ in the dominant political imaginary of FBV given the lack of willingness 
to confront present or historical wrongdoing or to explore the possible legitimacy of the ‘grievances’ 
of others. Indeed, Rogers (2008) questions the wisdom of using divisive language in such matters. A 
peculiar imaginary of insularity, revisionism and dogmatism is perpetuated when any admission of falli-
bility and error or any broaching of questions of collective responsibility appears ruled out of play. even 
what Gilroy calls the ‘unruly multiculture’ of ordinary life and interactions remains unacknowledged in 
Cameron’s image of siloed multicultures. Gilroy prefers to remind us of the ‘radical openness that brings 
conviviality alive [and that] makes a nonsense of closed, fixed and reified identity, and turns attention 
toward the always unpredictable mechanisms of identification’ (2004: xv).
Images, fictions or collective ‘illusions’ are not bad, per se, but they cannot be simply transcended 
by reason. Images are often, at least partially, constitutive of normative ethical and political life. They 
move us and they organise our affective lives and the investments of our desires. But there may be more 
creative ways of imagining ourselves and our body politics. Whilst one is wise to be vigilant in respect 
of identifying those images and ideas that generate sad passions, divisions and exclusions, there are 
also always opportunities to foster those that cultivate potentials for understanding, speaking, listening 
and conviviality. So many elements of convivial existence remain invisible and unnoticed when more 
powerful and monolithic images dominate and divide the political imaginary into those who belong 
by nature and birthright, and those who are ‘othered’. Gatens and Lloyd draw upon Tully’s (1995) image 
of ‘strange multiplicity’ and his conception of ‘critical freedom’ in order to explore relational and tran-
sindividual ideas of the body politic that do not image differences and identities as homogeneous or 
monolithic but rather see them as partial, inter-woven and cross-cutting. The contagion of our affective 
lives provides the ground through which we can come together, share our ideas, and better notice the 
tiny, often scarcely noticed, ways in which we already find ways of co-habiting or resisting together.
Images of vulnerability, contagion and resilience
In Mark Sageman’s provocative response to recent terrorist research initiatives, he says ‘The key assump-
tion behind this ‘‘Blame it on Islam’’ explanation of terrorism was that there was some mysterious process 
of indoctrination or brainwashing that transformed ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at risk’ naïve young people into 
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fanatic killers or true believers (2014, p. 567). He ridicules the idea that ‘sinister Al Qaeda agents lurking 
in the shadows of mosques spotted naïve Muslims based on some personal vulnerability (‘at risk’) and 
turned them over to recruiters’ (2014, p. 567). He argues that there is no evidence that these spotters/
recruiters exist and nor is there any real insight, despite all the research, as to what leads young people 
into political violence, although some answers can be given in respect of the ‘how’. He understands 
how the lack of empirical research, the politics of terrorism research, the lack of access to information, 
and the relative rarity of terrorist events in europe and the US means that a lack of specificity generates 
far too many false positives. It is this that should be of concern when making it a statutory duty to pre-
vent terrorism. The erroneous referral of young people to Channel has meant that in the case of 80% 
of referrals no grounds for concern are subsequently found. However, it is difficult to imagine that this 
referral or suspicion will not affect the child or young person, the family, the teacher and the school, or 
those other children and young people who fear being referred.
Prevent allows for the law to reach into the space of education, making explicit the legal requirement 
that teachers and lectures engage in counter-terrorist work by looking out for those students at ‘risk 
of radicalisation’ and by teaching FBV. It is stated, without evidence, that ‘extremists take advantage 
of institutions to share their poisonous narrative with others, particularly with individuals vulnerable 
to their messages’ (HM Government, 2013, p. 5). Given many people hold extreme or radical ideas and 
yet do not resort to violence, it is difficult to argue that the origin, cause or root of violent extremism 
lies in ideas or ideology, as it implied by policies like Prevent, and it is dangerous to suggest that these 
ideas provide the ‘pool’, ‘oxygen’ or ‘environment’ in which violent extremist ideas breed and mutate.
This policy position is somewhat at odds with some of the more tempered conclusions of a rapid 
evidence assessment called Understanding vulnerability in individuals to the influence of Al Qa’ida violent 
extremism that was commissioned by the Home Office (2011). It distinguished more clearly between 
radicalisation that involves support for terrorism and violent extremism, and radicalisation that involves 
views different from the mainstream but which does not support violence. Some of the psychological 
factors that they assess make someone vulnerable to AQ-influenced violent extremism include a crisis 
that leads to an ‘individual re-evaluating previously held beliefs and being open to new ideas’ (p. iii) 
and they suggest that ‘political ideology and grievances are consistent motivating factors’ (p. iii) for 
involvement in AQ-influenced violent extremism with some acting in vengeance for attacks. In the West, 
an important driver is the ‘perceived injustice and violence against Muslims around the world’ (p. iii) 
as well as other factors like status, power, money and so forth. They argue that radicalisation to violent 
extremism is a social process and that charismatic leaders can play a role, although recruitment tends to 
take place in private spaces and through the internet. They admit that there is little empirical evidence 
that could explain either vulnerability or resilience and they define risk or vulnerability factors as follows:
A risk factor or vulnerability factor is defined as an attribute, characteristic, condition or context that increases 
the probability of support for, or involvement in, violent extremism, or an increase in the level of involvement in 
violent extremism.
A protective factor or resilience factor is defined as an attribute, characteristic, condition or context that reduces or 
buffers the effect of one or more vulnerability factors, to prevent the move toward violent extremism. (2011, p. 3)
yet the report concludes that ‘the empirical evidence base on what factors make an individual more 
vulnerable to Al Qa’ida (AQ)-influenced violent extremism is weak. The evidence base on resilience to 
AQ-influenced violent extremism is even less well developed […]’ (2011, p. 36). Bartlett and Miller (2012) 
counsel against conflating violent and non-violent radicalisation, however the Channel Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework (2012) appears to ignore this advice by outlining 22 risk factors under three 
categories of engagement, intent and capability, which it examines separately. It does not sufficiently 
distinguish the factors listed under the first category Engagement with a group, cause or ideology from 
those of the second category of Intent to cause harm. Called ‘psychological hooks’ that describe ‘suscep-
tibilities, motivations and contextual influences and together map the individual pathway to terrorism’ 
(2012, p. 3), the list under Engagement includes ‘Feeling of grievance and injustice; feeling under threat; 
a need for identity, meaning and belonging; a desire for status; a desire for excitement and adventure; 
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a need to dominate and control others; susceptibility to indoctrination; a desire for political or moral 
change; opportunistic involvement; family or friends involved in extremism; being at a transitional 
time of life; being influenced or controlled by a group; relevant mental health issues’ (2012, p. 3). In the 
second category of Intent, there are no indicators of specific intent, instead more generic indicators are 
listed, including: ‘over-identification with a group or ideology; ‘Them’ and ‘Us’ thinking; dehumanisation 
of the enemy; attitudes that justify offending; harmful means to an end; harmful objectives’ (2012, 
p. 3). The final category of Capability to do harm examines logistical and material capabilities as well as 
knowledge and is the only category which seems appropriate in terms of a counter-terrorist strategy.
It is not clear how the assessment in Channel is ultimately made and what role the different cate-
gories play. Given the secrecy of the programme, and the consensus that most of those who adopt 
terrorist tactics are ordinary and they come from a wide variety of backgrounds, it is unclear how 
these indicators are helping to identify those who are most likely to undertake a violent attack. But 
one cannot prove what has never materialised in the first case. More importantly for educators is what 
this vulnerable assessment framework means for children and young people. Given the latitude for 
interpretations of most of those indicators that suggest that someone might be ‘at risk of radicalisa-
tion’, how secure can they feel about voicing their perspectives and experiences? Foucault (2003, 2005, 
2006, 2007) and Goffman (1987) amongst others have shown the way in which a medical diagnosis or 
a criminal conviction changes the way in which someone is seen or heard, and the way in which they 
come to experience and imagine themselves. If someone is identified as ‘potentially at risk’, or thinks 
that someone else might identify them as ‘at risk’, one’s statements are read, even by oneself, through 
a different therapeutic and medicalised lens such that very ordinary statements and feelings can end 
up being pathologised through the encounter with an ‘expert’ discourse. ‘Perhaps of most concern is 
that, despite their fundamental shortcomings, such approaches are currently being used to provide 
the intellectual justification and the technological ‘know-how’ for normalising state practices of disci-
pline and social control of Muslim children and young people – all in the name of ‘safeguarding’ them’ 
(Coppock & McGovern, 2014, p. 248).
Images of moral contagion and public health
Heath-Kelly argues that vulnerability is coupled with riskiness and ‘the language of (susceptibility to) 
persuasion, disadvantage and vulnerability is used to create a vulnerable potential terrorist subject 
separate from existing radical subjects (who prey on the weak, promote contagious ideas and take 
advantage of our ‘open institutions’)’ (2013, p. 404). This ambivalence as to whether subjects are poten-
tially vulnerable or risky is exemplified by the hesitant and provisional language of ‘might’ and ‘could’ 
and ‘some’ that populates preventative counter-terrorist documentation. This language of suscepti-
bility, vulnerability, riskiness and resilience is also mobilised in epidemiological models that develop 
preventative measures for public health. Indeed, the metaphor of virus or disease has been invoked 
both to describe terrorism and to describe extremist or radical ideas. In a problematic essay, Stares 
and yacoubian (2012) explicitly adopt a public health approach to terrorism. This plays on the image 
of a body politic warding off infection. Indeed, they suggest that terrorism should be imaged as a 
‘virus’ that can lead to infection. Arguably however, this epidemiological shift is also what is at play 
in the efforts to locate those individuals and populations ‘susceptible’ and ‘at risk’ of succumbing to 
radicalisation. It justifies pre-emptive intervention and the efforts to bolster immunity and resilience. 
However, there is, of course, significant danger in imaging political ideas as viruses, diseases or microbes, 
as it risks, quite literally, pathologising dissent. Stares and yaboubian (2007) describe the way in which 
disease metaphors populate terrorist discourse in particular in relation to Islamist ascendancy, and 
they point to phenomena of ‘social contagion’, but then take those images of terrorism as ‘microbe’, 
‘disease’, or ‘virus’ as offering a potential explanatory and predictive framework, premised upon public 
health initiatives, which could diagnose those populations and individuals at risk of the terrorist ‘virus’. 
By imaging terrorism as a virus or disease that has particular and identifiable vectors, they explicitly lay 
claim to the scientific credibility offered by epidemiological and public health approaches (to disease). 
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For example, they describe militant Islamist ideology as an ‘agent’ with two primary strains. Hosts are 
groups or persons infected with the agent (militant Islamist ideology) and the environment refers to 
likelihood of exposure (conflict, alienation etc.). Vectors (prisons, madrassas, mosques, etc.) are used 
to propagate the ideology. However, whilst virulent, it seems that the majority of Muslim populations 
are inoculated or ‘immunised’ against this virus, although some Muslims remain ‘susceptible’ (2007, 
p. 8–9). They describe the policy benefits of this epidemiological model and the way in which public 
health campaigns typically contain the threat, protect high-risk groups, and remedy the environmental 
conditions. They acknowledge that containment measures risk harming civil liberties so there are lim-
itations in respect of direct interventions, but they suggest propagating ‘ideological antidotes’ (2007, 
p. 13). now, whilst this epidemiological model is not expressly referred to within the Prevent literature, 
the language of ‘resilience’, ‘immunity’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘susceptibility’, ‘risk’ and indeed ‘partnership’ are 
resonant with approaches to public health. Stares and yacoubian’s suggestions bear some similarity 
to the kind of approach adopted by the British government, in particular engaging with moderate 
voices so that they can influence opinion, and interventions that ‘approximate health care’s attempts 
at treatment and rehabilitation of the infirm’ (2007, p. 14). ‘Ideological immunisation’, they also say, 
‘should offer a positive and compelling alternative vision for the future’ (2007, p. 16). However, unlike 
Prevent, they argue that efforts at remedial measures should be made to resolve violent conflicts that 
have a strong resonance with the Muslim world, and that the source and not the symptoms ought to 
be addressed. It is, perhaps, not unsurprising that one would see elements of this epidemiological 
approach in Prevent and Channel, but given that having an idea is presumably not quite the same as 
having a disease or infection, what does it mean for those populations identified as ‘at risk’, especially 
for those communities and individuals seen as in need of immunisation against certain ideas? What 
does it mean to immunise certain communities against certain ideas or to suggest some communities 
are more susceptible? The images of immunisation, contagion and infection are powerful ones, which 
preclude other strategies such as critical conversations about difficult and complex topics. How does one 
experience and image oneself if one cannot know, in advance, if one is at risk, susceptible, or infected? 
Indeed what would it mean to claim that extremist idea already lies within a person, co-habiting, like 
the HIV virus before symptoms are displayed? Can ideas lie dormant like viruses? Is the treatment for an 
idea a stronger alternative idea, like FBV? These are metaphors but they have real and material effects, 
in particular when mobilised as part of a wider constellation of concepts (resilience, immunity, and so 
forth). Kundnani says that attention is now on ‘the circulation of ‘extremist ideas’, seen as a kind of virus, 
able to turn people into violent radicals. This then leads law enforcement agencies to try to prevent 
exposure to this virus, whether it be via books, websites, preachers or radical activists’ (2012, p. 10). 
Aspects of Le Bon’s (2001) theory of crowd psychology also appear implicit in this documentation, in 
particular in relation to the way in which one can become susceptible to and held hostage by ideas. 
Interest in the porous body and mind by nineteenth-century thinkers had led to them viewing those 
who were susceptible to contagious influences as having both weakened defences and a compromised 
capacity for self-control (Forth, 2001, p. 64). Forth adds that
In this sense moral contagion represented a double capitulation to the outer world of ‘contagious ideas’ and to the 
inner world of affects and drives: the external ‘other’ seemed to form an alliance with the sensual ‘other’ within. not 
only does this suggest an eruption or uprising as well as a penetration, but it indicates that on an unconscious level 
the individual welcomed the collapse of the will that contagion entailed. (2001, p. 64)
Such minds were described as both effeminate and in microbiological terms. It was seen as necessary 
to ‘transform one’s inner garden into an inhospitable place for infectious thoughts’ (2001, p. 68). In this 
way one could protect oneself from ‘dangerous invasions’ (2001, p.68). It is this image of ‘contagion’ that 
seems to be shaping the idea that certain people and communities can be ‘susceptible’ or ‘vulnerable’ 
to extremist ideas or radicalisation. It is not clear that warding against this would either invite or involve 
robust critical discussions and enquiry in schools and communities, in particular if students (and their 
parents) are worried about being identified as at risk, or metaphorically quarantined through referral to 
Channel. Rather than reflecting on our mutual vulnerability, or the vulnerability of the human condition, 
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it is a particular community, Muslim people, which is deemed most susceptible and vulnerable to rad-
icalisation and to harbouring infectious ideas or the conditions in which those ideas can propagate.
When Coetzee described the metaphors of contagion and infection at play in colonial and apartheid 
discourses, he looked at the way in which certain groups and individuals are seen as more suggestible or 
susceptible to infection by ‘the germ of an idea’ ( 1996, p. 182). It is as though certain ideas (‘ideological’ 
ideas) do not serve as means to ends or to legitimate actions but rather they float ready to infect whole 
populations (1996, p. 183). One can easily be contaminated. In describing the experience of censorship, 
he says that the ‘censor is typically experienced as a parasite, a pathogenic invader of the body-self, 
repudiated with visceral intensity but never wholly expelled’ (1996, p. 10). The difference between the 
ontological claim that certain populations or individuals are particularly receptive and susceptible to 
certain kinds of ideas and the existential description of the gnawing doubt experienced by those cen-
sored is important. It is not that we could or wish to never be influenced, but rather that certain images 
of vulnerability and risk corrode our sense of being by undermining our capabilities and opportunities 
for knowing, through the encouragement of incessant self-questioning and paranoid doubt and the 
way in which we have been identified by (colonial) others as being at risk. As has already been argued, 
preventative counter-terrorism strategies are mobilising powerful medical, epidemiological and pastoral 
images in such a way that they are, wittingly or not, silencing the voice of those who might wish to 
question such strategies, or even those who might wish to engage in and encourage the kind of critical 
community of enquiry that one finds in those classrooms that are most alive with ideas.
Anticipatory logics: undermining credibility and communication
Given Gatens and Lloyd’s (1999) reflections on the importance of images in social and political imag-
inaries, in particular in relation to their constitutive and generative effects, there are arguably real 
implications when images of ‘vulnerability’, ‘resilience’, ‘support’ and so on are privileged in Prevent and 
Channel. A pastoral approach to security allows for interventions to be framed through the duty of 
care, and State involvement in the sphere of private religious beliefs is legitimated by labelling Muslim 
communities as vulnerable to violent extremism (2011, p. 168). Counter-terrorist work is deemed akin 
to pastoral governance, concerned with the well-being of the individual. Finally, this medicalises, as 
MacDonald and Hunter note (2013), the relationship with students and the educational situation, mak-
ing what are quite ordinary facets of the human condition problematic, pathological or deficits. All of 
this undermines the capacity for agency and resistance of those subjected to such programmes, and 
augments the fears of students who worry about being referred should they speak their minds. Dissent 
and disagreement with a professional over a medical diagnosis is seldom seen to be legitimate, wise or 
warranted, and the therapeutic/medical discourse privileges the authority of the expert voice and the 
scientific nature of the techniques of assessment and measurement. This epistemology of mastery claims 
knowledge in order to intervene and control, and it devalues the dissenting voice such that the person 
quite literally cannot be heard. This can be done by suggesting that the person is deluded, immature, 
manipulated, and so on. An equivalent demand for humility, criticality and self-reflexivity is not asked 
of the professional, be it the one who refers or the one who diagnoses. That said, many educators are 
both very much aware of their own limitations and deeply concerned with the implications of Prevent 
for their practice and for ethical relationships with their students.
In his thesis, ‘Autonomy in education’, Brian Collins explains how the moment that one is constituted 
in a particular way as criminal, prisoner or mad, one is no longer heard or listened to as one was before. 
It is as though an act of trans-substantiation has taken place such that what was previously innocuous 
is now seen as symptomatic of a pathology. Drawing on Foucault’s writings, in particular the concept 
of the Psy-function, he suggests this involves ‘attempts to harness the unpredictable nature of thinking 
through the policing of the speech act’ (2014, p. 138). To question the Psy-function, or the colonisation 
by psychological discourse of an increasing number of domains from education to security, is not to sug-
gest that there are not some children and young people who are vulnerable to manipulation, but rather 
to maintain that the pathways into terrorism are complex, and a strategy that targets indiscriminately 
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entire populations as ‘potential terrorists’ risks alienating those young people, not to speak of denying 
them the rights of full citizenship. The range of indicators that purport to show that someone is ‘at risk’ 
means that if we take them literally, a constant state of self-reflexivity and self-doubt is engendered 
since one does not know for sure whether one might be displaying those symptoms that could reveal 
one to be ‘at risk’. Any one of us is a potential terrorist.
Hook, writing of Foucault, explains that ‘The examination is not limited to the past, to the single 
deviant or criminal act that has already taken place, it is a measure of the subject’s future capability, 
their prospective dangerousness to society’ (2010, p. 16). In 1984, Orwell’s description of Winston’s 
dilemma shows how one must develop a perpetual self-reflexive and self-scrutinising awareness that 
is grounded in the possibility of being seen, rightly or wrongly, in a certain light.
There are certain ideas that are bad. It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any 
public place or within range of a tele-screen. The smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tic, an unconscious 
look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself - anything that carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of 
having something to hide. In any case, to wear an improper expression on your face (to look incredulous when a 
victory was announced, for example) was itself a punishable offence. (1961, p. 79)
Foucault believed that a subtle system focusing on potential behaviours emerged from workshop 
disciplinary practice in the eighteenth century. He writes, ‘One must be able to spot an action even 
before it has been performed, and disciplinary power must intervene somehow before the actual 
manifestation of the behaviour, before the body, the action, or the discourse, at the level of what 
is potential, disposition, will, at the level of the soul’ (2006, p. 52). Pre-cautionary and pre-emptive 
logics operating in the space of pre-crime inform policies like Prevent (Heath-Kelly, 2012). The intent 
and outcome of these disciplinary practices and techniques is that one comes to police oneself, one’s 
peers and one’s students and patients. Hook claims that ‘disciplinary problems hence advance by tak-
ing what were essentially political problems (problems of control), removing them from the domain 
of political discourse, recasting them into the neutral language of science and transforming them 
into technical problems for the sole attention of specialists and expert’ (2010, p. 21). Whilst he argues 
that such approaches are pre-emptive, in that they are prior to the translation of intention into act, 
the significant innovation with Prevent and Channel is that referrals and interventions are now pre- 
cautionary (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007), speculative, and, in principle, prior to any indication of intent 
on the part of the person referred, in that one may show the signs and symptoms indicating that one 
is ‘at risk’ without either intent or action. It is not, however, permissible to profile in such a precaution-
ary or speculative manner (Hadjimatheou, 2011) given the considerable risk of harm. Martin (2014) 
makes a careful conceptual distinction between pre-cautionary and pre-emptive logics and provides 
an analysis of both Prevent and Channel interventions. He argues that through invoking care, Channel 
can govern (counter-) radicalisation at a distance through expertise and by using a range of profes-
sionals enmesh responsibility for (counter-) radicalisation throughout society. These interventions are 
seen as non-political and enacted through a duty of care. Martin describes these interventions as both 
medicalising and pastoralising.
What are the effects of this kind of therapeutic imaginary that seeks to identify those ‘vulnerable’ 
to or ‘at risk of radicalisation’ or in need of ‘support’? By positioning the image of vulnerability as prob-
lematic (ecclestone, 2012), it privileges a sovereign conception of autonomy as opposed to which 
it presents the vulnerable person as someone ‘at risk’. Such a person appears to be wholly passive, 
susceptible, and prey to virulent and powerful ideas. Coppock and McGovern (2014) argue that this 
demonstrates the tendency to psychologise social problems: terrorism is now explained by emotional 
dysfunction. Prevent operates with a deficit model, privileging positive psychological outcomes of 
well-being, rather than interrogating the ways in which children and young people explore ways of 
belonging, developing agency, finding significance and committing to ideals or resisting injustice. It 
does not investigate, as Scott Atran, (2015) suggests, the idealism, desire for justice, quest for meaning, 
compassion, and utopianism that often motivate young people, including those who join groups like 
ISIS, nor does it take seriously the expression of foreign policy grievances including the deaths of tens 
of thousands of people as a consequence of conflicts that involve the UK, the US and others. The effect 
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of this particular image of vulnerability is to silence and to create self-doubt and fear (Durodié, 2016; 
Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011). Indeed, Coppock and McGovern argue that ‘vulnerability is framed within 
specific, and again deeply problematic, conceptions of young people’s mental health and well-being’ 
and this means that young British Muslims are being ‘rendered as appropriate objects for state inter-
vention and surveillance’ (2014, p. 242).
Conclusion: the risk of pre-emptive testimonial injustice and the prospect of 
hermeneutical injustice
From research in Muslim communities, Mythen argues that the consequence of Prevent and Channel 
is that ‘a range of speech gaps were described, ranging from being unable to openly share political 
opinions, to a lack of representation in public affairs and a feeling of being ignored by government 
in the formation of security policies (2012, p. 418). One participant says ‘That’s what’s so frightening 
about the laws being brought in. not only do they make you check yourself all the time, but think about 
what could happen’ (2012, p. 418). Others say ‘yeah they talk about freedom of speech, but where’s the 
freedom of speech for us?’ and ‘We don’t have freedom of speech. Democracy is for white people’ (2012, 
p. 418). Mythen reflects upon these young people’s fears about being ‘labelled as a terrorist sympathiser’ 
and their ‘uncertainty about the reach of counter-terrorism law’ (2012, p. 421).
So many indicators can serve as potential symptoms or markers of risk, especially if one is a Muslim, 
that speaking freely becomes ever more difficult. not only the student but also the teacher or lecturer 
must engage in constant self-scrutiny, since the implications of error are so serious in a ‘risk society’. 
Democratic polities ought, at least according to Spinoza, to foster public communication and the 
exchange of ideas, but these policies, regardless of their intent, undermine this by making students 
and their families, in particular Muslims, fearful of speaking freely. Imposing an interpretative framework 
on the words of another means that they are not given the opportunity to explain themselves and their 
perspectives. This is particularly of concern in those cases where people are worried that what they 
say, even when they do not support violence, may lead to referral under counter-terrorism legislation.
The aspiration to codification – not to be confused with the (entirely honourable) ambition to make explicit any 
general principles that may usefully be extrapolated from virtuous sensibility – is revealed as an impulse to take 
refuge in a bogus objectivity; an impulse, that is, to evade the indefinite creative demands made on one by ethical 
life. (Fricker, 2007, p. 75)
Images circulate and operate in society in powerful ways and different affective regimes cluster 
around different images. This has particular force when someone’s being, words and/or actions is inter-
preted through the lens of a constellation of images that constitute particular (kinds of ) people as more 
potentially vulnerable or at more potential risk of radicalisation. Moreover, dominant collective social 
imaginations also shape responsiveness to the credibility of statements of different speakers. Kundnani 
(2014) has documented some of the difficulties experienced by young people referred to Channel in 
terms of their ability to challenge the very idea that they required de-radicalisation, and to be listened 
to and taken seriously. Miranda Fricker explains that some voices are not given the same credibility 
as others – some have a credibility excess and others a credibility deficit (2007, p. 17). In the case of a 
credibility deficit, she argues that this constitutes a particular kind of epistemic injustice ‘in which some-
one is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower’ (2007, p. 20). epistemic injustice is an ethical issue 
and not simply a matter for epistemology because there are structural and ideological considerations 
that render some voices, prima facie, untrustworthy or unreliable. Testimonial injustice tends to be 
systematic and related to wider forms of identity prejudice. She describes this as an ‘identity-prejudicial 
credibility deficit’ (2007, p. 28). This means that certain speakers are given less credibility in the credibility 
economy, whilst others are given more credibility (like middle class, middle aged, white males). Another 
form of testimonial injustice takes place in silence and silencing. ‘It occurs when hearer prejudice does 
its work in advance of a potential informational exchange: it pre-empts any such exchange’ (2007, 
p. 130). She calls this ‘pre-emptive testimonial injustice’ and the element of her analysis of this concept 
that has most bearing on our appraisal of Prevent legislation is her argument that
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the credibility of such a person on a given subject matter is already sufficiently deficient in prejudicial deficit that 
their potential testimony is never solicited; so the speaker is silenced by the identity prejudice that undermines her 
credibility in advance. Thus purely structural operations of identity power can control whose would-be contributions 
become public, and whose do not. (2007, p. 130)
Prevent and Channel through emphasising and codifying indicators of ‘vulnerability’, ‘susceptibility’ 
and so forth, and by instituting relations of ‘care’ and ‘pastoral governance’ serve, a priori, to diminish 
the credibility of certain populations by constituting some people as ‘potentially’ risky or suspect, and 
by instituting unequal hierarchies of power that privilege ‘expert’ discourses, even when the evidence 
for such approach lacks credibility in the wider field of research on terrorism. even if the legislation 
purports to address all extremist ideas and all those at risk of radicalisation, the primary focus is, de 
facto, on Muslims. The circulation of these images, and the association with Muslims, generates different 
kinds of affective investments. These influence which people are seen as more or less credible. Fricker 
argues that ‘testimonial injustice excludes the subject from trustful conversation. Thus it marginalises the 
subject in her participation in the very activity that steadies the mind and forges an essential aspect of 
identity – two processes of fundamental psychological importance for the individual’ (2007, pp. 53–54). 
It is the concept of ‘psychic alienation’, derived originally from Fanon, that perhaps best captures the 
kinds of debilitating paralysis and self-doubt that stops one from speaking for fear of how one will be 
heard or constituted, in particular when one risks being constituted as ‘at risk’. Foucault’s descriptions 
of cases in Psychiatric power (2006) explains well how some speakers will not be heard in the same way 
once they are categorised as prisoner or patient (or even the person ‘at risk of radicalisation’), as the 
hearer will often not retain the same testimonial sensibility when listening to these subjects. In any 
case, the speaker’s concern and perception that she will not be heard or will be misinterpreted risks 
engendering the experience of ‘psychic alienation’. It is here that the demands of epistemic justice may 
clash with the claims of expert judgement.
The use of preventative interventions to secure public and individual safety is familiar but Paul Gilroy 
has argued that a more accurate description of our contemporary political systems is ‘securitocracy’. The 
implications of preventative counter-terrorist strategies for epistemic justice and the unequal distribu-
tions of the economy of credibility warrant further investigation, in particular given what we know about 
how people, once labelled by an expert or authority, have such difficulty in contesting those labels, be 
it in the case of the psychiatric patient or that of the colonised person. not only do we need to reflect 
on the dominant collective imaginaries reflected in the language of preventative counter-terrorism, 
in particular those that mobilise epidemiological and therapeutic images which have implications for 
hermeneutical justice, but we ought also to consider whether challenging ideas ought to be in the 
remit of security agendas if those ideas do not have a direct relationship with violence. Given the nature 
of identity prejudice, stereotype and bias, the issue of epistemic injustice is inseparable from that of 
collective social, political and educational imaginaries.
And finally, we need to think about the implications of these strategies in terms of testimonial 
injustice, in particular pre-emptive testimonial injustice, and hermeneutical injustice, and for radical 
and critical thought and activism. What will it mean if generations of Muslim young people are afraid of 
speaking their minds in schools and universities for fear of being misrepresented and misheard? What 
are the implications of refusing to distinguish clearly between violence and non-violence in counter- 
terrorism? If our ways of being and our ways of knowing are co-imbricated, what does it mean to be 
fearful of speaking freely? How will the requirement that educators operate as counter-terrorist inform-
ants impact upon relations of trust and honesty in classrooms? And finally, how can the securitisation 
of education be challenged and resisted, and what are the implications of not doing so for our polities?
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